Boards As Normative Arenas

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Boards As Normative Arenas

I develop a conceptual model of corporate boards as normative arenas, self-regulated by rules embodied in the organization's norms and routines. I apply this theory to explain the routinization of CEO selection in U.S. industnal corporations. An analysis of the competing nsks of insider versus outsider succession provides strong evidence for reliance on formal and informal CEO selection routines. To test for alternative explanations for why boards rely on selection routines, I examine the mediating effects of performance, firm age, ownership structure, and early CEO departures on their persistence. The findings support the view of boards as normative arenas.

Statement of Responsibility

Author(s)

William Ocasio - Personal Name

Edition

Call Number

ISBN/ISSN

1000864765

Subject(s)

Boards As Normative Arenas

Classification

NONE

Series Title

GMD

Management

Language

English

Publisher

Publishing Year

2013

Publishing Place

Collation

1-66

Specific Detail Info

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