Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

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Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

This paper examines the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities, unresolved agency problems may cause managers to over- or under-invest in tax avoidance relative to the preferences of shareholders. Using quantile regression, we find that the impact of corporate governance on tax avoidance is most pronounced in the upper and lower tails of the tax avoidance distribution, but not at the mean or median of this distribution.

Statement of Responsibility

Author(s)

Christopher S. ArmstrongJennifer L. Blouin, Alan D. Jagolinzer and David F. Larcker - Personal Name

Edition

Call Number

ISBN/ISSN

Subject(s)

Corporate Governance

Classification

NONE

Series Title

Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

GMD

Corporate Governance

Language

English

Publisher

Publishing Year

2014

Publishing Place

Collation

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