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STATE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
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Bargaining in the international system is governed by rules, which shape and constrain states’ bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently under different sets of rules? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state’s incentives regard- ing whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states’ bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states’ behavior in international bargaining processes.
Heather Elko McKibben is an assistant professor at the University of California, Davis. She received her Ph.D. in political science at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to her current position, she held a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.
HEATHER ELKO McKIBBEN - Personal Name
1st Edtion
978-1-107-08609-8
NONE
STATE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
Management
English
Cambridge University Press i
2015
USA
1-346
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